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REPORT SUMMARY
This report examines the impact of Proposition 2-1/2 on different types of
communities and the implications of this impact for state aid and state-level policies.
The effects of 2-1/2, especially first-year effects in public education, are evaluated from
the perspective of four general policy objectives or values: equity, efficiency,
accountability, and local autonomy. The primary concern of this report is for various
considerations of equity and inequality.
The Message of 2-1/2: The report briefly reviews evidence that voters were expressing
three primary concerns in voting for Proposition 2-1/2: the need for greater efficiency in
state and local government spending, relief from inequities in the property tax burden,
and a demand for greater public accountability.
Urban Distress: Analysis of various local characteristics in cities, suburbs, rural towns,
and high property-wealth resorts reveals that Massachusetts cities are fiscally stressed in
at least four ways: (1) They have substantially lower-than-average property wealth and
are thus handicapped by Massachusetts' near-total reliance on local property taxes.
(2) They suffer from significant budgetary fiscal distress in the form of high service
demands and cost factors, and a high proportion of fixed costs in the local budget.
(3) They suffer from higher-than-average citizen fiscal distress in the form of the local
tax burden, lower-than-average income levels, and a high proportion of poverty families.
(4) They exhibit below-average demographic and economic vitality in the form of
population decline, low in-migration of new families, an old housing stock, and higher-
than-average unemployment.
Proposition 2-1/2 Impacts: The biggest "losers" in the first three years under Proposition
2-1/2 have been precisely these same, fiscally-stressed cities (and communities in the
bottom property-wealth quintile). Cities have experienced the greatest losses in local
revenue in each of the three years under 2-1/2, ana the greatest net losses in the first two
years after receiving new state aid. Cities and low property-wealth communities also
made the most substantial cutbacks in local school budgets—particularly in instructional
expenditures. While declining enrollments were related to educational cutbacks, they
were less significant in explaining cutback size than local property wealth or local tax
rates. Cities and low-wealth communities were likely to reduce their teaching workforce
at a substantially higher rate than would be explained by enrollment decline.
Equal Educational Opportunity; Equal educational opportunity suffered in the first year
under 2-1/2 in two ways: (1) Instructional cutbacks were most substantial in communities
with the largest poverty populations and in school districts which sent a smaller
percentage of their high school graduates to four-year colleges and universities. These
patterns existed within each community type studied. (2) Spending disparities in FY 1982
were at their worst level since before the reform of Chapter 70 (1978). 1982 cutbacks
resulted in a reversal of two equalizing trends that had occurred in the years 1978-81: the
tendency of cities, rural towns, and low-wealth communities to spend at below-median
levels increased in 1982, and the overall statewide variation in spending levels increased
slightly in 1982.
Educational Equity: Educational (pupil) equity suffered slightly because of 2-1/2 related
cutbacks. The relationship between local property wealth and local income on the one
hand and per pupil spending on the other became stronger in 1982. In both cases, equity
measures indicated less equity in 1982 than in any year since before the Chapter 70
reform. Taxpayer equity, or the relationship between local tax rates and spending levels,
improved slightly as a result of Proposition 2-1/2. The school finance system remains
inequitable according to both standards, however.
State Ability to Achieve Equity: The inequitable impact of Proposition 2-1/2 raises
questions about the state's ability to achieve equity in local spending, especially in light of
state aid distributed after 2-1/2 as well as the history of Chapter 70 aid to education.
Chapter 70 and Equity: Analysis of the revised Chapter 70 formula and aid distribution
reveals three significant findings: (1) New state aid distributed in the first year under the
"Boverini-Collins" Act was significantly equalizing; most was channeled to cities and low-
wealth communities, despite the save-harmless provision. (2) Cities and low-wealth
communities were, however, likely to use new aid increments to reduce locally-generated
revenue for education (i.e., reducing taxes) rather than increasing per pupil spending. On
the other hand, suburbs and high-wealth communities were likely to increase spending
with new aid increments. The result was an improvement in taxpayer equity, but no
improvement in educational equity. (3) The long-range effect of the save-harmless
clause has been to favor precisely those communities that were least "needy" according to
the Chapter 70 formula—namely, higher income suburbs and high property wealth
communities. This occurs largely because of declining pupil enrollments in conjunction
with underfunding of Chapter 70.
Local Autonomy: It is clear that local autonomy in budgetary decision making as it is
currently structured is (however valuable) an obstacle to state efforts to achieve equity.
However, analysis of teacher contract conflicts and citizen access reveals two pertinent
findings: (1) Contract mediation and/or fact-finding is likely to occur in fiscally pressured
communities; there is no link between contract conflicts and either current-year or
subsequent-year spending levels or increases. (2) While local governance systems vary in
their degree of citizen access or representation, communities with town meetings were
far less likely to make substantial cuts in instructional staff in 1982 than communities
with city or town councils—regardless of the size, density, community "type", or level of
fiscal pressure in a given community. As a result, it seems unlikely that either teacher
organization activity or local accountability to citizen input are in and of themselves
obstacles to achieving equity.
Conclusions: (1) In terms of equity , the report concludes that the burden of Proposition
2-1/2 and inequitably distributed state aid is ultimately being borne by needier pupils and
their families. In essence, Massachusetts is moving away from , rather than towards,
fulfillment of its policy responsibilities in education. (2) Inefficiency in government
spending has increased at the state level because of the "something-for-everyone"
principle underlying local aid (particularly because of the save-harmless provision in
Chapter 70). It has also increased at the local level in urban areas because of excessive
educational cutbacks in conjunction with increases in administrative budgets. (3) In
addition to evidence gathered elsewhere that public involvement in local decision making
has declined in the aftermath of Proposition 2-1/2, the report suggests that public
accountability varies from community to community in a manner that intensifies the
inequitable effects of local fiscal stress. Communities with a higher degree of citizen
access in local government and with a proportionately higher school constituency are also
communities that are relatively free from fiscal distress. The result is increased
educational inequity.
State Policy Options: This report takes the view that (1) the state has a significant policy
responsibility for equality of educational opportunity and equity, and (2) state policy
makers should seek to optimize the values of equity, efficiency, accountability, and local
choice in their efforts to achieve educational equity.
The correspondence between inequities in local accountability and inequities in local
fiscal stress virtually guarantees that Massachusetts cannot achieve educational equity or
ensure equal opportunity simply by increasing state aid, no matter how equitably it is
distributed. This is especially the case since school committee fiscal autonomy has been
repealed, although it is not clear that fiscal autonomy successfully "protected" school
committees from municipal fiscal and polical pressures. As a result it would seem that
the effort to achieve equity in an efficient manner, without violating local accountability,
would include three elements:
(1) The re-separation of educational and municipal budgets and their link to state
funds, together with increases in local citizen access in both school and municipal
governing bodies.
(2) A substantial increase in the state share of financial responsibility for public
education in conjunction with a substantially more equitable distribution of state funds
(including a phase-down of save-harmless guarantees).
(3) Constitutional changes that allow wide latitude in local tax sources for municipal
spending. Local tax options should maximize the opportunities for equity; where inequity
in revenue-raising ability or local service-demand still exists, a reduced component of
state aid is required.
URBAN DISTRESS, EDUCATIONAL EQUITY, AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE:
STATE-LEVEL POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSITION 2 1/2 IN MASSACHUSETTS
Overview
This report analyzes the impact of Proposition 2 1/2 on the 351 cities
and towns of Massachusetts using the most current data available from a
number of state agencies and other sources. The report complements the
findings of previously published studies, including those of the Impact 2 1/2
consortium at M.I.T., the Massachusetts Departments of Education and Revenue,
the Massachusetts Association of School Committees and Massachusetts Municipal
Association, and individual researchers. The analysis that follows focuses
primarily on questions pertinent to policymaking at the state level.
The study describes and evaluates the impact of 2 1/2 by focusing on
two primary questions:
(1) Who are the "winners" and "losers," to date, under 2 1/2? Which
types of communities and populations have suffered the most sub-
stantial revenue losses and local budget cutbacks, particularly
in education?
(2) Who are the winners and losers in terms of state aid generated
in response to 2 1/2?
Descriptively, the report documents the effects of 2 1/2 in terms of
revenue losses in the first three years, and local expenditures for educational
and municipal budgets in FY1982. Furthermore, in the area of education, I
will examine shifts in appropriations and expenditures for the instructional
and administrative portions of local school budgets. These effects are ana-
lyzed in communities grouped according to population 4ize, property wealth,
per capita income, population density, and a number of other characteristics.
The most consistent pattern in terms of these effects reflected the distinct
experiences of communities classified as cities, suburbs, rural towns, and
resorts.
In addition to describing 2 1/2 effects, the report evaluates the state-
wide impact of 2 1/2 in terms of four guiding policy objectives or values:
equity, efficiency, accountability, and local autonomy. I will discuss evi-
dence below that the vote for Proposition 2 1/2 was in good part an expression
of the first three of these values; the fourth, local autonomy, has long been
a cherished tradition in Massachusetts and the other New England states.
The chief concern in evaluating the distribution of Proposition 2 1/2
effects is with equity, for two reasons. First, it is important to know if
the burden of revenue losses and cutbacks is fair . That is, are expenditure
reductions greatest in communities that are simply spending extravagantly or
in school districts with sharp declines in pupil enrollment, or does the burden
of 2 1/2 fall disproportionately on communities that are less able to raise
local revenue or have higher service demands or costs? Prior to analyzing
2 1/2 effects, I will review variations in these local characteristics.
Second the principle of equity is of special significance in the area of
public education, as is the state's concern for this policy objective. The
goal of equal educational opportunity has been interpreted by the U. S. Supreme
Court to be chiefly a state responsibility. Because the Webby v. King case
before the State Supreme Judicial Court is based on the charge that Massachusetts
is deficient in meeting this responsibility (as defined by the state consitution)
,
this objective is of critical importance at the state level. In a later portion
of this report, I will evaluate the impact of Proposition 2 1/2 on educational
equity using per pupil spending figures for the fiscal years 1978-1982 and a
variety of statistical tests.
As a result of the concern for equity and the state's role, much of the
analysis that follows focuses on the impact of 2 1/2 on public education.
This does not imply that other areas of local budgets have not suffered sub-
stantially in the wake of 2 1/2. [For analysis of municipal budget areas,
see Smoke, 1983, and MMA, 1982.] However, in dollar terms, public education
consumes the largest portion of local budgets and thus, not surprisingly, it
absorbed the largest reductions under 2 1/2 in both dollars and personnel.
As a result, school cutbacks have triggered the most contentious debate among
public officials and political groups.
The evaluation of the state response to 2 1/2 not only examines the degree
to which state aid has been equitably and efficiently distributed, but the
degree to which the state can enhance equity, particularly in education, under
the existing scheme of state and local finance and governance. [The state's
experience of trying to enhance educational equity through reform of Chapter 70
in 1978 is particularly instructive in this regard, as will be documented
below. ] The latter consideration raises questions about factors that affect
local budget decisions—in particular, the degree to which educational spending
is affected by municipal fiscal pressures, citizen access to decision makers,
and teacher organization activity. These issues loom as more significant given
the removal of fiscal autonomy for local school committees.
The results of this study are sobering. First, the effect of 2 1/2 has
been anything but equitable. Revenue losses have been most pronounced in the
fiscally strapped cities (that also have high service needs) . Educational cut-
backs, particularly in instruction, have been largest in communities with a
smaller percentage of high school graduates attending four-year colleges and
universities (and a high proportion of low- income families) . In all likeli-
hood, the educational opportunities of disadvantaged children have been di-
minished. The state has provided upwards of $400 million in new state aid
designed, at least in FY1983, to remedy inequities under 2 1/2. Yet the net
losses have still been greatest in the cities and low property wealth com-
munities, and Massachusetts' already inequitable school finance system has,
if anything, worsened slightly.
If the state is to enhance equity and to heed the voters' demand for
greater accountability and efficiency in government, state policy makers will
have to make some tough choices. The concluding section of the report reviews
the tradeoffs between the four policy objectives of equity, efficiency, ac-
countability, and local autonomy in light of state experience in the recent
past and in light of currently discussed options.
PROPOSITION 2 1/2: THE VOTERS SPEAK
In evaluating the "message" of 2 1/2, it is important to bear in mind the
fact that the voters were actually sending a variety of messages to their
public officials in that one vote. Or, more precisely, different groups of
voters were sending different messages. The message of the prime movers of
2 1/2, Citizens for Limited Taxation, was clear: cut taxes and reduce govern-
ment spending. However, systematic evidence from a number of sources suggests
that voters were particularly concerned about the inefficiency (rather than
the level) of government spending and service provision, the lack of account-
ability for government spending decisions, and the inequity built into the
heavy reliance on property taxes for local services.
Furthermore, studies of the "taxpayers' revolt" phenomenon nationwide
hav? suggested that voters are also expressing a general disaffection, a sense
of powerlessness in influencing their political environment.
This attitude suggests both that significant decisions should be made locally
and that citizens generally should have effective input into those decisions.
Analysis of public opinion surveys in the period preceding and following
the vote for 2 1/2 provides reliable insight into the general perceptions and
attitudes held by voters. Several studies revealed that voters were con-
cerned about "waste, inefficiency, and corruption" in state and local govern-
ments (Becker, 1980, Ladd and Wilson, (1981a, 1981b,) and Patterson, 1980,
1981) and the property tax burden in particular (Ladd and Wilson, 1981,
Patterson, 1980). However, with the exception of public welfare, there was
little support for a reduction in the level of public service delivery.
In fact, the primary distinction between supporters and opponents of
2 1/2 was not the support (or lack thereof) for the value of government ef-
ficiency, but the perception of the degree of inefficiency and the effect
that passage of 2 1/2 would have (Ladd and Wilson, 1981b). Supporters believed
that substantial cuts could be made in local budgets without a significant
loss in service delivery. Opponents expected that 2 1/2 would cut significantly
into local service delivery, particularly in education. Supporters also be-
lieved that 2 1/2 would increase their control over local school committees,
reflecting the repeal of fiscal autonomy contained in the referendum.
Perceptions and beliefs are, of course, the stuff of politics. It is
also important, however, for policy makers to know if variations in support
for 2 1/2 reflected actual local policies. In an earlier study, I analyzed
variations in the local vote for 2 1/2 in light of such local characteristics
as spending levels, tax rates and burdens, property wealth, and local votes
for other statewide referenda and candidates. The findings are instructive
and bear out some of the general results of public opinion analysis; however,
they accentuate the relationship between support for 2 1/2 and inequities
built into Massachusetts' reliance on local property taxes.
When the margin of support for 2 1/2 is broken down by communities clas-
sified according to the level of local property wealth, tax rates, municipal
and school spending, an interesting pattern can be seen. As illustrated
in Table I, support for 2 1/2 was strongest in communities characterized by
low property wealth, high tax rates, moderate levels of per capita municipal
spending, and low-to-moderate levels of per pupil educational spending. In
other words, support was strongest in communities which suffered from tax in-
equities—i.e. communities that, because of lower property wealth, taxed
themselves at high rates in order to attain moderate levels of spending.
These communities were most typically urban. Within suburban communities,
where support was also high, vote for 2 1/2 was more likely to reflect con-
servative orientations (such as strong support for President Reagan in the
1980 election. Support was highest overall in suburbs (an average of 62.2%)
and cities (59.1%).
Please see Table I on page 7.
Regression analysis revealed that the strongest determinant of support
for 2 1/2 was the local tax rate; however, when the one takes into account
the degree to which tax rates reflect property values, the size of the tax
rate coefficient declined, highlighting the equity concern (Morgan, 1982).
Support for President Reagan still accounted for significant portions of
the variation in support for 2 1/2.
These findings became more significant once the effects of Proposition
2 1/2 are reviewed. They would seem to indicate that urban voters may have
supported 2 1/2 to bring a halt to soaring property taxes in the hope that
this might force some accountability in local governments as well as state
reforms that enhanced equity. Suburban voters on the other hand may have been
supporting less government in a manner that reflected a conservative philosophy,
TABLE I
SUPPORT FOR PROPOSITION 2 1/2 IN DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES
1980 Equalized
Property Wealth
Per Capita
s on 2% Ye 1/2'
Quintiles:
Poorest 60.0%
Mod. -Poor 61.4%
Moderate 59.8%
Mod. -Wealthy 58.1%
Wealthiest 52.1%
1980 Full Valiue
Tax Rate
% Y«=s on 2 1/2
Quintiles:
Lowest 49.5%
Mod . -Low 57.7%
Moderate 59.4%
Mod. -High 62.4%
Highest 62.0%
1980 Per Capiita
Municipal
Spending
% Yes on 2 1/2
Quintiles:
Lowest 55.2%
Mod . -Low 61.1%
Moderate 59.5%
Mod. -High 61.0%
Highest 55.1%
1980 Per Pupil
Educational
Spending
% Yes on 2 1/2
Quintiles:
Lowest 58.2%
Mod . -Low 60.1%
Moderate 60.3%
Mod. -High
.
57.8%
Highest 54 . 1%
*Statewide Average: 58.3%
Data Sources: Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, Massachusetts Department
of Education. Compiled by author.
anticipating accurately that they would not feel the brunt of cutbacks (which
would instead be forced on the "wasteful" cities) . Whether or not this inter-
pretation is accurate is, of course, somewhat speculative.
A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING 2 1/2 EFFECTS: LOCAL CHARACTERISTICS
This section reviews demographic, economic, and budgetary data for local
communities classified as cities, suburbs, rural towns, and high property
wealth resorts. In order to facilitate the evaluation of 2 1/2 effects, these
same groupings are used throughout this report.
The classification scheme is based primarily on three criteria: location
within or outside the Census Bureau's Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(SMSA's), the balance between residential and industrial/commercial property,
and (in the case of resorts) property wealth. Cities include all the SMSA
"central cities" and surrounding communities that are heavily industrial/
commercial. [Because of their significance in this report, individual cities
are itemized in the Appendix.] Suburbs are all other communities within SMSA's
—
i.e., those that are largely residential. Rural towns include all communities
that lie outside SMSA's except for high property wealth resorts . The latter
are a special case—typically on the seacoast (particularly Cape Cod) or the
Berkshires, with high per capita property values, substantial property owned
by non-residents, and (often) a low-to-moderate income resident population.
Each of the community types tends to have distinct service needs and/or
fiscal characteristics that are pertinent to policy makers. Of course, con-
siderable variation exists within eacb grouping, and thus in later sections
attention is given to distinctive sub-groups (for example, high income suburbs)
Given Massachusetts' reliance on property taxes, the factor that must be
considered the primary measure of ability to raise local revenue is property
wealth (of all the measures that follow, property wealth was the single most
important determinant of both municipal and educational spending levels) . As
can be seen in Table II, equalized property values for 1980 and 1982 are dis-
tributed unevenly among the four community types, with cities operating at a
disadvantage and high-wealth resorts blessed with an ample revenue source.
These figures are no surprise and, in fact, are taken into account in some
state aid distributions.
TABLE II
EQUALIZED PROPERTY VALUATIONS (PER CAPITA), 1980, 1982
1980 1982
Cities $ 11,495 $ 16,380
Suburbs 18,619 26,240
Rural Towns 17,668 23,330
High-Wealth Resorts 73,938 111,273
State Average 23,614 33,482
Data Sources: Massachusetts Department of Revenue,
Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation
Compiled by author.
A number of additional traits are, however, pertinent to the revenue
raising capacity of localities. These are divided into two groups, one re-
flecting what might be called "budgetary fiscal distress," the other "citizen
fiscal distress," or various measures that reflect the degree to which the
2
local population is burdened by taxes (or dependent on service provision).
Table III illustrates four measures of budgetary fiscal distress. Popu-
lation density is a local characteristic that is associated with higher service-
provision costs and/or demands, while the portion of local budgets allocated
for debt payment aiu'/or pension payment reflects degrees to which local policy
makers cannot manipulate budget appropriations to meet new contract demands
or 2 1/2-imposed cutbacks (of course, other areas of local budgets, such as
10
assessments from county, regional and state governments, are similarly
"fixed").
Please see Table III on page 11.
As can be seen in the table, cities have disproportionately high popu-
lation density, high per capita dollar payments for both debt and pension
obligations, and a proportion of local expenditures for debt and pensions that
Is almost twice the state average. While the need for these extensive obli-
gations, particularly in pension payments, is open to argument (Massachusetts
cities are not atypical in these obligations) , the fact of these commitments
acts as a significant burden on cities' abilities to absorb 2 1/2-induced
revenue losses.
Table IV indicates variations in local characteristics loosely termed
citizen fiscal distress. Cities and rural towns have per capita income levels
that are significantly below the state average, and the gap between "rich"
and "poor" is widening, particularly in the case of cities. Cities also have
a higher proportion of families below the poverty line, although both rural
towns and resorts also have higher-than-average numbers of poor families.
Resorts have the largest elderly populations, though cities are also above-
average on this measure.
These figures are different indicators of the local population's ability
to pay taxes, and on all four measures, urban populations fare poorly. In
strict income terms, rural towns also are "disadvantaged," while in resorts
the burden of taxes is likely to be felt by sizeable poor and elderly popu-
lations.
Actual tax rates are substantially higher in cities than in other com-
munities, although tax rates for schools :-re only sligntly higher than the
state average and about on a par with those in suburbs. The degree to which
11
TABLE III
BUDGETARY FISCAL STRESS
1980 % of 1981
Population Expenditures for
N Density* Debt and Pension Payments
Cities 5,513 13.7%
Suburbs 1,295 7.7
Rural Towns 299 6.0
High-Wealth Resorts 248 6.5
State Average 1,209 7.5
1981
Per Capita
Debt Payments
Cities $67.15
Suburbs 43.41
Rural Towns 32.37
High-Wealth Resorts 52.86
1981
Per Capita
Pension Payments
$55.85
22.01
12.01
15.64
State Average 42.69 20.97
*Population per square mile.
Data Sources: U. S. Census Bureau, Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation
Compiled by author.
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local populations are actually burdened by local taxes is reflected in the
proportion of personal income that is captured in the local tax levy. Urban
populations are somewhat more burdened in this respect than those in suburbs
or rural areas. [The figure for resorts is unreliable since the income
figure pertains only to the resident population, while the levy draws substan-
tially on non-resident property.]
Table V reveals patterns in what might be termed local economic and
demographic "vitality," reflecting population growth, the age of the housing
stock, and the local unemployment rate. A declining population and old housing
stock are measures associated with fiscal stress. Massachusetts cities are
clearly characterized by declining population, low in-migration, old housing,
and higher-than-average population (the latter pattern was duplicated in
October, 1982, although with higher levels of unemployment). Rural areas and
resorts registered high population gains and high unemployment.
TABLE V
LOCAL DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC VITALITY
Cities
Suburbs
Rural Towns
Resorts
State Average
1970-80 % of Population % of Housing % Unemployed
Population Lived Elsewhere Built Before October, 1981
Change (%) 1974-79 1939
- 4.1% 5.3% 56.2% 6.0%
8.5 7.0 33.6 5.0
22.6 7.0 43.4 6.1
46.1 11.2 34.6 6.8
16.7 7.3 34.5 5.7
Data Sources: U. S. Census, 1980; Massachusetts Division of Employment Security
Compiled by author.
Finally, local communities varied in their pattern of past spending in
the years preceding Proposition 2 1/2. As can be seen in Table VI, both per
capita municipal spending and per pupil educational spending were highest in
14
TABLE VI
LOCAL SPENDING: MUNICIPAL AND EDUCATIONAL, 1981
1981 Per Capita
Municipal Spending
(includes Education)
Cities $ 888
Suburbs 837
Rural Towns 701
High-Wealth Resorts 1110
1981 Per Pupil
School Spending
$ 2434
2415
2232
2881
State Average 821 2399
Data Source: Massachusetts Department of Education; Massachusetts
Taxpayers Foundation
Compiled by author.
the high property wealth resorts. [This is to be expected given the finding
that property wealth was the most significant determinant of local spending.]
Municipal and educational spending is slightly higher-than-average in cities
(as well as suburbs) , however not to a degree that would easily justify a
charge of "overspending," particularly in light of high density and service
needs. [This is noteworthy since the 2 1/2 sponsors, Citizens for Limited
Taxation, used per capita spending levels as evidence of excessive spending
—
C.L.T., n.d.] In both total and school budgets, rural towns spend signifi-
cantly less than other community types. Also, of note, both municipal and
educational spending has increased most rapidly over the past five years in
rural towns and resorts.
In sum, the data bear out the claim that Massachusetts cities, like
others in the Northeast and Midwest, are fiscally stressed: caught between
high service demands, low revenue-raising ability, and a tax-burdened popu-
lation. Proposition 2 1/2 promised to relieve some of the tax burden, al-
though as seen below, the result was not an improvement in equity.
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THE IMPACT OF PROPOSITION 2 1/2
Analysis of 2 1/2 effects confirms that the brunt of Proposition 2 1/2
was borne most heavily by Massachusetts cities and by lower property wealth
communities. As the following tables indicate, this pattern prevails when*
one looks at revenue losses (or gains) in each of the first three years after
passage of Proposition 2 1/2 net revenue changes (after state aid distribu-
tion) in 1982 and 1983, municipal and school budget cutbacks, reductions in
instructional and administrative school expenditures and in the teacher
workforce . Data are reported for community types and property value quin-
tiles, and where relevant other local traits linked with large cutbacks are
reported.
Local Revenue Losses/Gains, 1982-1984
As can be seen in Table VI, in each of the three years following the
implementation of 2 1/2, cities and communities in the lowest property wealth
quintile registered losses in per capita revenue due to the tax levy restric-
tions under 2 1/2 (FY84 figures are Department of Revenue estimates) . In
the first year under 2 1/2, total revenue losses were distributed more evenly
when excise tax losses are taken into account. Still cities lost signifi-
cantly higher per capita dollars in 1982. Local revenue losses in -FY83 and
FY84 (estimated) were concentrated in cities, communities with populations
greater than 50,000, and the lowest property wealth and per capita income
quintiles.
Please see Table VI on page 16.
Revenue Losses After State Aid
In both 1982 and 1983, the state distributed substantial new aid dollars
in an effort to ease the blow of Proposition 2 1/2. In the aggregate, this
16
TABLE VI
LOCAL REVENUE LOSSES/GAINS: 1982 - 1984
Cities
Suburbs
Rural Towns
Higb-Wealth Resorts
State Average
1982 Property Tax
Dollars /Capita
$ -93.2
-51.2
-30.1
-18.1
1982 Total Tax
Dollars /Capita*
$ -114.8
- 81.8
- 58.4
- 50.2
-43.7 - 73.7
Low Property Wealth
Low-Moderate Wealth
Moderate Wealth
High-Moderate Wealth
High Wealth
-52.3
-49.2
-50.8
-46.7
-21.2
78.5
74.8
79.6
74.8
58.0
1983 Property Tax
Dollars /Capita
Cities
Suburbs
Rural Towns
High-Wealth Resorts
State Average 8.9
1984 Est. Property Tax
Dollars /Capita
$ -23.7 $ -- 9.6
12.0 13.8
8.4 10.7
27.3 20.4
11.1
Low Property Wealth
Low-Moderate Wealth
Moderate Wealth
High-Moderate Wealth
High Wealth
- 6.6
2.1
10.7
13.5
24.0
.5
9.3
12.5
•14.0
19.7
*Includes property and excise tax revenue
**Equalized property valuation per capita, 1980, quintiles
Data source: Massachusetts Department of Revenue
Compiled by author.
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aid probably helped localities immeasurably. However, the distribution of
aid failed to overcome the inequities in revenue losses, as can be seen in
Table VII. In 1982, aid was distributed according to the so-called "Lottery
Formula" resulting in considerable inequities and local windfalls. [The
biggest winners, in per capita dollar terms were rural towns.] In light of
these inequities, aid was distributed in 1983 in a manner designed to relieve
revenue losses directly.
TABLE VII
NET GAINS /LOSSES IN PER CAPITA DOLLARS*: 1982-1983
FY1982 FY1983
Cities
Suburbs
Rural Towns
High-Wealth Resorts
State Average - 35.6 25.7
Low Property Wealth -$25.3 6.6
Low-Moderate Wealth - 33.7 14.3
Moderate Wealth - 45.5 25.3
High-Moderate Wealth - 43.1 25.0
High Wealth - 29.2 57.9
*Local Revenue Losses/Gains Plus New State Aid
Data Source: Massachusetts Department of Revenue
Compiled by author.
Net Winners and Losers, 1982-1983
When communities that registered net losses are compared to those that
registered net gains in each of the first two years under 2 1/2, three of
the local characteristics examined in the preceding section stand out. Revenue
losers in both years have significantly lower per capita property wealth than
revenue winners, are substantially more densely populated , and have a higher
percentage of families below poverty . In other words, communities that lost
-$67.7 $ 6.0
- 48.0 23.8
- 15.7 16.3
- 27.6 82.2
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revenue after receiving new aid were those with less local revenue-raising
ability, and higher service needs. State aid, in other words, failed to
compensate for the inequitable impact of Proposition 2 1/2.
Another comparison can be seen in Table VIII in which individual com-
munities registering the greatest revenue loss in 1983 (before and after aid
and 1984 are listed, along with the ratio of their per capita property wealth
to the statewide average. The table is notable for the repetition of names
listed in the three columns. By and large, the biggest revenue losers in
1983 were still the biggest revenue losers even after receiving state aid
(designed to compensate localities for 2 1/2 losses) . They were also likely
to be the biggest revenue losers in 1984. Furthermore, each "loser" had a
local revenue-raising ability that was substantially below the state average
(and all but West Boylston were more densely populated than the state average)
TABLE VIII
COMMUNITIES REGISTERING GREATEST PER CAPITA REVENUE LOSSES, 1983--1984
1983 Before1 (EV 1983 After (EV 1984 Before
State Aid Ratio)** State Aid Ratio)"k* State Aid*
1. Boston $-•117.4 (.39) Quincy $ -87.5 Boston $-99.8
2. Cambridge •107.0 (.57) Revere -80.5 Lynn -70.5
3. Quincy •100.6 (.57) W. Boylston -43.8 (.69) Revere -68.5
4. Hull • 98.4 (.55) Rockland -42.6 (.45) Chelsea -61.7
5. Lynn •82.9 (.39) Boston -39.0 Worcester -56.6
6. Revere • 80.5 (.46) Holyoke -30.8 (.36) Somerville -55.7
7. Chelsea • 72.6 (.26) Worcester -29.4 Pittsfield -45.7
8. Brockton 71.0 (.41) Lynn -28.9 Brockton -43.8
9. Greenfield - • 68.9 (.54) Somerville -28.4 (.36) Quincy -43.3
.0. Worcester • 66.5 (.37) Chelsea -25.3 Greenfield - 4.6
*At this writing, the distribution of 1984 state aid is still not known.
**Ratio of local equalized property valuation per capita to state average.
Data Sources: Department of Revenue, Massachusetts Taxpayers 1 Foundation
Compiled by authc-.
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For example, the city of Chelsea, which has very low property wealth, lost
$72.6 per capita in local revenue in 1983 (after losing substantial funds
in 1982) , still was one of the largest revenue losers in the state after re-
ceiving significant amounts of compensatory state aid in 1983, and then reg-
istered another $61.7 per capita loss in 1984. Although local expenditure
data are not yet available for 1983, examination of local expenditure cut-
backs in 1982 illustrate the impact of revenue losses comparable to these.
1982 Expenditure Cutbacks: All Cities and Towns
Table IX illustrates the reductions (or increases) in local spending
among the four community-types and the five property wealth quintiles in the
first year under 2 1/2. Included are changes in total local expenditures,
changes in the non-educational portion of local budgets, and changes in the
integrated educational operating costs (from the Department of Education's
data in which expenditures for regional schools are integrated into local city
and town figures)
.
Please see Table IX on page 20.
As can be seen in the table, cities made significantly greater reductions
in total spending than any of the other community types. Similarly, the
middle three property wealth quintiles reduced spending by a greater per-
centage. In addition, spending cuts were greatest in the low-moderate income
quintile and in communities with the lowest and highest population density.
When educational and non-educational portions of the local budget are
compared an interesting finding emerges. Cities were likely to make greater-
than-average cutbacks in both budget areas. However, suburbs and the higher
property wealth quintiles concentrated their cutbacks in non-educational
areas, while preserving school budgets. [This tendency was particularly pro-
nounced in the high-income suburbs in greater Boston.] Resort communities
20
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and lower property-wealth quintiles tended to cut more substantially in
education, while preserving non-educational expenditures.
In other words, education budgets tended to be the target of cutbacks in
lower property wealth communities, resorts and rural towns, and cities, while
school budgets were protected in the wealthier suburbs and high property wealth
quintiles (which include many of the wealthier suburbs) . Given the fact that
suburbs, in particular, have high proportions of school-aged children in their
population, this suggests that budget decision-makers were more "responsive"
to school demands where school constituencies were relatively larger and
fiscal pressures weaker. They were less responsive where school constituencies
were smaller and substantial fiscal pressures existed.
An additional finding is interesting. Non-educational cutbacks were nega-
tively (though weakly) related to per-pupil spending for education, while
educational cutbacks were positively related. What this means is that com-
munities that spend at high per pupil levels tended to make cuts in other
municipal services, while those that spend at low per pupil levels tended to
make cuts in education. Clearly, this pattern does not serve educational
equity. More significantly, it suggests a local dynamic that may work against
state efforts to enhance equity—a topic discussed below. [The reader should
note that, as expenditure data, these figures include the receipt of state
aid.]
Local School Districts: Educational Cutbacks
It is possible to learn more about educational cutbacks by examining
budget decisions in communities where all academic schools lie within the
local jurisdiction (i.e., including towns that use regional vocational schools,
but are not part of academic regional school systems). [This sample includes
176 cities and towns, almost exactly half of the state total. It tends to
under-represent small rural communities.]
22
As indicated in Table X, cities and low-to-moderate property wealth
communities reduced school spending more substantially than other community
types. This pattern was true for the total school budget, for the instruc-
tional portion of the budget, and for personnel reductions in the teaching
workforce. Furthermore, cities were substantially more likely to make large
(greater than 10%) reductions in the total and instructional budgets. In
addition, cutbacks were greater in the lowest income quintiles, and in com-
munities with a high percentage (8%+) of families below poverty. Among
suburbs, the size of cutbacks increased as property wealth and income de-
clined; high income suburbs in greater Boston actually registered a slight
increase in school spending.
Please see Table X on page 23.
These patterns raise a number of questions relevant to the concern for
equity and equal educational opportunity. In particular, it would appear
that cutbacks were more substantial, particularly in instruction, in com-
munities characterized by large poverty populations and, often, lower levels
of educational spending. These issues will be examined in the next section.
Additional questions regarding the reasons for school cutbacks require
closer scrutiny before the fairness of the 2 1/2-impact can be evaluated.
First, a number of local characteristics were significantly associated
with teacher workforce reductions: low property wealth, a high tax rate, low
per capita income, high fiscal constraint (as measured by the percent of
municipal expenditures designated for debt and pension payments) , declining
pupil enrollments and low access built into local governance (i.e., a city/
town council as opposed to a town meeting) . Of these local school tax rates
and property values were most significantly linked to cutbacks. When revenue
losses were taken into account, property wealth explained the largest percent
23
TABLE X
LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT CUTBACKS 1982
Cities
Suburbs
Rural Towns
Resorts
State Average
% Change in % Change in
Total School Instructional % Change in
Expenditures* Expenditures Teacher Workforce
-7.4% -8.5% -15.3%
-3.6 -4.3 -11.4
-3.5 -5.8 -12.0
2.1 - .8 - 4.7
-4.0 -5.1 -11.9
Low Property Wealth
Low-Moderate Wealth
Moderate Wealth
High-Moderate Wealth
High Property Wealth
-4.6
-7.2
-4.2
-3.5
2.2
-7.1
-7.0
-5.5
-3.4
-13.0
-14.7
-12.2
-10.4
- 6.1
Cities
Suburbs
Rural Towns
Resorts
State Average
% Reducing Total % Reducing Teacher
School Expenditures Workforce More
More than 10% than 10%
34.4% 71.9%
15.2 39.4
13.9 50.0
22.2
17.6 46.6
Low Property Wealth
Low-Moderate Wealth
Moderate Wealth
High-Moderate Wealth
High Property Wealth
17.0
32.4
17.5
14.3
59.6
51.4
52.5
32.1
20.8
Data Sources: Massachusetts Department of Education, Massachusetts Association
of School Superintendents Survey
Compiled by author.
*From funds appropriated by local school districts from tax revenues and state
aid.
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(13%) of the variation in cutbacks. School tax rates, per capita income, de-
clining pupil enrollments, fiscal constraint, and governance structure also
explained modest percentages in teacher workforce cutbacks.
Regardless of the size of local revenue losses, then, cutbacks in the
teaching population tended to reflect three distinct qualities: municipal
revenue-raising ability or fiscal constraints, declining pupil enrollments,
and the degree of citizen access built into local government. Each was a
factor in and of itself—that is, independent of the others. The degree to
which revenue-raising ability was linked to cutbacks indicates an inequitable
effect. The link with declining pupil enrollments indicates that communities
were, to a degree, bringing their workforce (and, therefore, budgets) more
in line with pupil populations, (i.e. an efficiency effect). The link with
governance structure suggests that cutbacks in a service-delivery area like
teaching personnel may have been more difficult in communities where citizens
had more direct access to budget decisions (suggesting variations in account-
ability—discussed later)
.
Another indication of the fairness of cutback distribution emerges when
one compares the percent reduction in teaching personnel to the decline in
pupil enrollments for the same time period. As can be seen in Table XI,
teacher reductions statewide were 2.9 times as great as the drop-off in pupil
enrollments. Cities, rural towns, and the lower two property-wealth quintiles
registered higher-than-average ratios, while suburbs, resorts, and higher
property-wealth quintiles registered lower-than-average ratios. [For additional
comparison, statewide teacher workforce reductions in 1982 were 1.5 times as
great as the decline in pupil enrollments from 1970-80. There was little
variation among different community types in this ratio.]
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TABLE XI
RATIO OF TEACHER CUTBACKS TO PUPIL ENROLLMENT DECLINE, 1981-82
Ratio
Cities 3.2 to 1
Suburbs 2.4 to 1
Rural Towns 4.3 to 1
Resorts 1.5 to 1
State Average 2.9 to 1
Low Property Wealth 3.3 to 1
Low-Moderate Wealth 4.4 to 1
Moderate Wealth 2.4 to 1
High-Moderate Wealth 2.0 to 1
High Property Wealth 1.7 to 1
Data Source: Massachusetts Association of School Superintendents
Survey, Massachusetts Department of Education
Compiled by Author.
These findings indicate that cutbacks in cities were not simply a re-
flection of declining enrollments (both cities and suburbs registered sub-
stantial enrollment decline). Of additional note, there was little difference
in the percentage of local schools closed by cities and suburban communities.
However, city superintendents were more likely to cite "fiscal pressures" as
the reason for school closings, while suburban superintendents were more likely
to cite "enrollment decline" (source: Massachusetts Association of School
Superintendents survey, analyzed by author).
While overall school budgets and instructional expenditures were declining
in most communities in 1982, expenditures for school administration actually
increased (raising questions about the efficiency impact of 2 1/2). Table XII
compares the change in appropriations for administration to the change in
expenditures for administration. The former reflects anticipated revenue
losses, while the latter reflects actual losses after state aid was received.
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TABLE XII
APPROPRIATIONS AND EXPENDITURES FOR SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION 1981-2
Cities
Suburbs
Rural Towns
Resorts
State Average
% Change in % Change in
Appropriations Expenditures
- 9.4% 1.8%
- 2.3 3.2
- 1.3 4.8
14.8 7.9
- 3.0 3.5
Data Source: Massachusetts Department of Education
Compiled by author.
While it is possible that expenditure increases in administration re-
flected the budget "crisis" of 2 1/2, it is doubtful that they produced an
increase service delivery efficiency. From this vantage point, the trend in
cities is particularly disturbing. First, cities reduced school spending
overall (and instructional spending in particular) more than other districts.
Second, at the same time, cities increased administrative spending, even
though city school systems have been criticized for overspending for admin-
istration. Third, the change from appropriations to expenditures suggests
that city school systems tended to channel new state aid into administration,
rather than rehiring laid-off teachers (or otherwise bolstering instructional
programs) . [There was little change in the instructional budget reduction
from appropriations to expenditures.] These trends suggest a need for a more
detailed study of local school systems (as, for example, is being conducted
by the Impact 2 1/2 Consortium)
.
Finally, the comparison of revenue and expenditure changes from several
sources in 1982 provides a rough composite picture of the various fiscal
forces operating in local school districts (the figures below are for the
27
176-community sample). As can be seen in Table XIII, all types of com-
munities suffered losses in Federal revenues (for education) in 1982 (on
top of 2 1/2 losses) . These losses fell especially heavily on cities and
high property wealth resorts. Added to the substantial losses in property
tax revenue, local receipts (from the excise tax and other assessments and
sales), and a smaller-than-average increase in state aid, it is not surprising
to find that school spending from all sources decreased most significantly in
the cities.
Please see Table XIII on page 28.
Comparing shifts in revenue sources, Federal cutbacks were felt partic-
ularly intensely by cities and high property wealth resorts. Property tax
losses were felt most intensely by cities and low-wealth communities. Boston
and the other central cities were the biggest losers, as were low income com-
munities. Local receipt losses were greatest in rural towns, suburbs, and
low property-wealth communities. State aid gains were greatest in suburbs
and rural towns and smallest in high-wealth communities.
By piecing together these different revenue sources, one can derive an
"explanation" of the overall shift in school spending in each type of locality-
subject to two qualifications: (1) percentage figures are misleading since
different communities rely on different revenue sources to varying degrees,
and (2) the "missing link" is the degree to which budget decision-makers dis-
tributed cutbacks between educational and municipal budget areas (see Table
IX)
.
The end result is a significant decline in total school spending in
Massachusetts cities (and a smaller decline in suburbs
—
particularly low-to-
moderate income suburbs)
.
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EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND EDUCATIONAL EQUITY
As noted earlier, the state's widely acknowledged responsibility for pro-
viding an adequate education for all its citizens is one reason why the edu-
cational effects of Proposition 2 1/2 are so important. As a form of "legis-
lation" subject to revision and amendment in the legislature, Proposition 2 1/2
is susceptible to the same constitutional guarantees that apply to other laws.
In keeping with the general focus Of this report, this section focuses on
the distributive effects of 2 1/2 in education. Specifically, I will examine
two types of effects for the first year under 2 1/2 (data for the second year,
FY1983, will not be available until spring, 1984). In terms of equal educational
opportunity , I will examine FY1982 educational cutbacks in terms of two local
population traits: the percent of families below poverty and the percent of high
school graduates that go on to attend four year private and public colleges and
universities (1980 data). [The latter measures are not necessarily measures of
school system quality. However, they do at least reflect variations in edu-
cational advantages or disadvantages present in different communities and their
populations.] I will also examine equal opportunity effects by focusing on dis-
parities in per pupil spending in FY1982 as compared to previous years.
Second, I will examine two forms of educational equity . Ex ante (or taxpayer)
equity refers to the relationship between local tax effort (measured by the tax
rate) and per pupil spending. In an equitable school finance system, spending
is a function of tax effort (rather than wealth or ability) . Ex post (or pupil)
equity reflects the standard of fiscal neutrality that has been applied in the
Serrano case in California (as well as in other states)—namely that per pupil
spending is not a function of local property wealth, but only of the wealth of
the state as a whole. Measures of each are examined for FY1982 and previous
30
years back to FY1978, the year prior to passage of Chapter 70 reform under
3
the "Boverini-Collins" Act.
Effects on Equal Educational Opportunity
The previous section clearly demonstrated that first-year cutbacks in
education were most substantial in Massachusetts cities. Earlier analysis es-
tablished that these same cities have larger proportions of poverty families
and elderly, and lower per capita income than cities and towns statewide. In
addition, the income gap between cities and other communities widened from
1970 to 1980. Given the educational disadvantages often associated with pov-
erty, one can argue that equal opportunity objectives would require that cities
make a greater-than-average effort to enhance the educational opportunities
of their pupils. The same argument applies to small rural towns.
However, spending data (Table VI) revealed that cities spend only slightly
higher than the state average, while rural towns spending significantly lower.
Consequently, it is no surprise, as indicated in Table XIV, that substantially
smaller proportions of high school graduates in cities and rural towns go on
to attend four-year colleges or universities after graduation. Similar dis-
crepancies occur among communities classified by property wealth and per capita
income; namely, low income and low wealth communities send substantially smaller
proportions of their high school graduates to four-year institutions of higher
learning, whether private or public.
Please see Table XIV on page 31.
Reflecting these patterns, school cutbacks fell most heavily on populations
that were poorer and less educationally successful. Reductions in instructional
budgets, for example, were heaviest in communities with relatively high pro-
portions of poverty families. Communities with less than five percent poverty
31
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families cut instructional budgets by an average of 2.4% while those with 5-8%
below poverty reduced budgets by 5.2% and those with more than eight percent
below poverty cut 8.3%.
These effects were not limited to cities and rural towns. In fact, the
same cutback pattern existed among each of the community-type classifications,
as indicated in Table XV. Among cities, suburbs, and rural towns, the greater
the percent of families below poverty, the greater the reductions in teaching
personnel and instructional budgets. [Note that most cities fall in the
high-poverty group, while most suburbs fall in the low-poverty group.]
TABLE XV
LOCAL POVERTY POPULATIONS AND CUTBACKS IN INSTRUCTIONAL BUDGETS, 1981-82
Cities Suburbs Rural Towns High-Wealth Resorts
Poverty
Population % Reduction (N) % Reduction (N) % Reduction (N) % Reduction (N)
Less than 5% -3.5% (2) -3.1% (63) -1.9% (3) 2.6% (2)
5% to 8% -8.5 (7) -5.5 (31) -4.3 (16) 1.2 (4)
More than 8% -8.9 (23) -11.4 (5) -7.6 (17) -2.5 (3)
Data Sources: U. S. Census, 1980, Massachusetts Association of School Superintendents
Compiled by author.
Similarly, cutbacks were most substantial in communities characterized by
low percentages of high school graduates attending four-year colleges and uni-
versities. As indicated by Table XVI, school districts sending less than 16%
of their high school graduates to private four-year colleges and universities,
and less than 35% to either public or private institutions made the largest re-
ductions in their instructional budgets. Those sending the highest percent to
four-year institutions made the smallest budget cuts. With the exception of re-
sorts, a similar pattern existed within each community type. Similar patterns
also existed in teacher workforce reductions and total budget cuts.
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TABLE XVI
COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY ATTENDANCE RATES AND LOCAL INSTRUCTIONAL CUTBACKS, 1981-82
% Reduction % Reduction
Percent of H. S. Graduates Percent of H. S. Graduates
Attending 4-Year Private Attending 4-Year Private
Institutions or Public Institutions
Less than 16% -7.1% Less than 35% -7.8%
16 - 25% -5.7 35-45% -5.7
More than 25% -3.2 More than 45% -2.7
Data Source: Massachusetts Department of Education
Compiled by author.
4
The assessment of spending disparities and educational equity focuses
both on changes from FY1981 to FY1982 and on five-year trends in these figures.
The former provides a picture of 2 1/2 effects, while the latter raises ques-
tions about the state's overall role in enhancing both equity and equal op-
portunity.
As can be seen in Table XVII, both cities and rural towns have been more
likely to fall below the state median (mid-point) in per pupil spending in
every year since 1978. In FY1982, the percentage of cities spending below
median levels increased over FY1981, while the percentage of high property
wealth resorts in this group declined.
Over the five-year period, two patterns are discernible. First, the 1978
Chapter 70 reform improved the standing of cities slightly, an improvement that
continued through 1981. Proposition 2 1/2, however, reversed this trend. Second,
there has been almost no improvement in the relative standing of communities
grouped by property wealth since 1978. In other words, despite the Chapter 70
reform in 1978, equal opportunity has not improved at all according to this
measure.
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TABLE XVII
PERCENT OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS SPENDING AT BELOW--MEDIAN LEVELS 1978-•1982
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Cities 66.7 60.6 60.6 51.5 57.6
Suburbs 36.9 39.3 39.3 41.0 41.0
Rural Towns 63.8 62.3 62.3 62.3 63.0
High Wealth Resorts 10.0 10.0 6.7 20.0 13.3
76.5 73.5 75.0 79.4 79.4
67.1 67.1 67.1 65.7 72.9
45.7 51.4 50.0 47.1 51.4
45.1 42.3 42.3 39.4 32.4
16.7 15.3 16.7 19.4 15.3
State Average 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
Low Property Wealth
Low-Moderate Wealth
Moderate Wealth
High-Moderate Wealth
High Property Wealth
Data Source: Massachusetts Department of Education, Massachusetts Taxpayers
Foundation
Compiled by author.
Spending disparities among individual school districts can be measured in a
variety of ways. Table XVIII illustrates disparities from 1978 to 1982 using
three measures that reflect the gap in per pupil spending between districts
ranked in different percentiles: the range in per pupil spending from the highest
to lowest district, the restricted range from 95th to 5th percentiles (excluding
"extreme cases) , and the disparity index (reflecting the ratio between spending
levels at the 95th and 5th percentiles).
Two more complicated measures are included reflecting the overall variation
in per pupil spending among all districts. The coefficient of variation is com-
puted by dividing the standard deviation by the mean—in other words, it mea-
sures the degree to which districts deviate from the mean adjusted for each
year's average spending level. The relative deviation from the median is the
average deviation from the median (midpoint) divided by the median.
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TABLE XVIII
PER PUPIL SPENDING DISPARITIES 1978-1982
Range: Highest-Lowest
Range: 95th-5th
Percentile
Disparity Index
Coefficient of
Variation**
Relative Deviation
from the Median
1978
4241
1979
3568
1980
3117
1981
3874
1982*
3989
1201 1062 1142 1476 1459
1.81 1.72 1.69 1.79 1.79
.24 .19 .17 .19 .20
.157 .134 129 141 .146
*First year under Proposition 2 1/2
**Standard deviation divided by the mean
Data Source: Massachusetts Department of Education
Compiled by author.
Each of the latter measures provides useful additional information. For
example, the coefficient of variation of .20 in 1982 means that two-thirds of
all school districts lie within 20 percent of the average per pupil spending
level (while about one-sixth of the school districts lie more than 20 percent
above and one-sixth lie more than 20 percent below the mean) . The relative
deviation from the median equals half the difference between the average
spending level for districts above the median and the average for districts
below the median, expressed as a percent of the median. As a result, the
relative deviation is the percent by which statewide spending would have to
increase in order to raise all below-median districts to the average level
attained by above-median districts.
The picture which emerges from the table is not overly dramatic. However,
some significant patterns can be discerned. First, on all disparity measures,
equal opportunity improved in the first year under the Boverini-Collins reform.
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Second, after this first-year improvement, spending disparities tended to
increase, particularly in 1980-81. Third, in 1982, the first year under
Proposition 2 1/2, disparities increased on three measures: the total range
in per pupil spending, the coefficient of variation, and the relative de-
viation from the median. While these changes were slight, the result is
that in 1982 equal opportunity , as measured by spending disparities (excepting
the restricted range) , was at its worst level since passage of the Chapter 70
reform . Revenue shifts in FY1983 and FY1984, and the 2 1/2 percent limitation
on local levy increases, suggest that this trend will only worsen in the im-
mediate future.
Similar patterns can be discerned in equity measures. As can be seen
in Table XVIX, the correlation between local property wealth and local income
and per pupil spending was stronger in FY1982 than it was before passage of
Chapter 70 reforms. In other words spending was more strongly linked to
property wealth. Furthermore, if one uses more up-to-date property valuation
figures, spending is more strongly associated with both property wealth and
income than it was for any of the years included in the table. One difference
in the table: passage of the Boverini-Collins Act did not improve educational
equity as it did equal opportunity.
TABLE XVIX
EDUCATIONAL EQUITY: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PROPERTY WEALTH, INCOME AND SPENDING
FY1978 FY1979 FY1980 FY1981 FY1982*
Per Capita
Equalized Property
Valuation, 1980 .48 .50 .40 .51 .50 (.52)**
Per Capita
Income, 1980 .35 .45 .50 .45 .54
*First year under Proposition 2 1/2
**Equalized Valuation Per Capita, 1982
Data Sources: Massachusetts Department of Education, Massachusetts Taxpayers
Association, Massachusetts Department of Revenue
Compiled by author.
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Table XX compares ex ante and ex post equity measures for the five years,
using standardized regression coefficients (beta weights) . As can be seen
in the table, property wealth has maintained a consistent impact on per pupil
spending, and thus the ex post equity standard is not fulfilled. School tax
rates had a weak, negative relationship with spending in 1978 and 1981 (in
other words, high tax rate communities actually spent less per pupil—
a
testimony to the significance of property wealth inequities). In other years,
including 1982, there was no statistically significant relationship—i.e.,
school tax rates had no measurable impact on spending levels. Thus the stan-
dard of ex ante is also not fulfilled. The Chapter 70 reform in 1978 improved
ex ante equity but had little effect on ex post equity. Proposition 2 1/2
resulted in a slight decline in ex post equity and a slight improvement in
ex ante equity.
TABLE XX
EX POST AND EX ANTE EDUCATIONAL EQUITY, 1978-1982 (REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS)
FY1978 FY1979 FY1980 FY1981 FY1982*
Property Wealth
1980 .48 .50 .40 .51 .50(.52)**
School Tax Rate
1980 -.19 -.09 -.08 -.15 .05
*First year under Proposition 2 1/2
**Equalized Property Wealth, 1982
Data Sources: Massachusetts Department of Education, Massachusetts Taxpayers
Association
Compiled by author.
By any of the foregoing measures, Massachusetts system of school finance
is far from equitable. Contemporary comparisons with other states are difficult,
if not impossible to arrive at. However, Massachusetts ranked very low among
states nationwide in the equity of its school finance system in the late 1970' s,
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and thus it seems unlikely that any significant improvement has taken place
since 1978. From the perspective of equity, this is disturbing, for the state
has significantly increased its contribution to localities
—
particularly in
1979, when educational equality was a primary objective of new state aid.
As the state confronts new demands for state aid or other means of com-
pensating localities burdened by Proposition 2 1/2, this past failure to
enhance equity should be instructive, particularly if state policy makers
are concerned about efficient uses of state revenue. The remaining portions
of this report focus on this issue, first by examining the Chapter 70 reform
in 1978 and its link to per pupil spending, and then by looking at two local
factors that may affect decisions regarding the use of state aid: teacher
organization activity and local citizen access.
THE STATE'S ABILITY TO ACHIEVE EQUITY
The Impact of the Boverini-Collins Act, 1978
Critics of Chapter 70 funding have raised three questions regarding the
state's ability to achieve equity in educational spending. First, the new
Chapter 70 (like its predecessor) has never been fully funded, thus cutting
substantially into funds designated for needy communities by the new aid dis-
tribution formula. Second, the reform included a save-harmless guarantee that
no district would receive less than 107% of its 1978 aid level, a guarantee
that has remained in place since 1979. Third, due to local decision making,
there were no guarantees that the new aid would result in educational equal-
ization. Some have feared, for example, that teacher organizations would
capitalize on suddenly available funds for large salary gains.
The first criticism remains true on its face. The absence of full funding
limits the state's ability to counteract local property wealth inequities,
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especially with the save-harmless provision built into the legislation. The
latter two criticisms are examined below; both the save-harmless guarantee
and local decision-making autonomy have undermined the state's ability to
achieve equity, although not in quite the manner expected.
First, as can be seen in the first two columns of Table XXI, the dis-
tribution of new state aid was clearly equalizing (regional districts are
not included) . That is the actual dollar flow was concentrated in the direc-
tion of cities and low property wealth communities. [Low income and rural
communities, and those with high poverty populations also benefitted signifi-
cantly from the reform. ] This was true both in per pupil dollars and in per-
centage increases in Chapter 70 aid. In other words, the degree that the
save-harmless clause cut into initial aid disbursements was not a significant
hindrance to equalization (the long-range effect of the save-harmless clause
is analyzed below)
.
However, the picture that emerges from columns 3-5 illustrates why equity
was not greatly enhanced by the reform. Cities and low property wealth com-
munities received by far the largest allotments of new aid, yet they increased
per pupil spending only slightly more than other communities. However, their
local contribution (in per pupil dollars) to school spending declined signifi-
cantly, while that of other community types increased significantly. One
reason for this pattern can be discerned in column five; cities (especially
Boston and the other central cities) and low property wealth communities cut
their local school tax rates significantly. [The tax rate changes are only
rough indicators of actual taxation changes, since re-assessment and revalu-
ation practices may be hidden in these figures.]
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TABLE XXI
THE EFFECTS OF NEW STATE AID UNDER THE BOVERINI-COLLINS ACT, 1979
% Change in
Dollar % Increase Locally- Millage
Increase % Increase in Per Generated Change in
in Per in Ch. 70 Pupil Per Pupil Local School
Pupil Aid
$180.6
Aid Spending
11.4%
Spending
-4.9%
Tax Rate
Cities 32.3% -3.7 mills
Suburbs 35.1 9.7 10.0 6.0 -1.0
Rural Towns 38.4 14.1 9.6 6.2 -2.9
High Wealth Resorts 9.9 7.0 7.9 5.1 .5
State Average 47.3 13.3 9.7 4.9 -1.8
Low Property Wealth
Low-Moderate Wealth
Moderate Wealth
High-Moderate Wealth
High Wealth
02.0 38.7 10.1 -5.8 -4.7
42.1 9.7 10.4 7.7 -1.2
27.5 7.1 8.8 5.2 - .6
22.4 7.0 9.4 4.9 - .2
30.4 8.9 9.7 5.1 -1.3
Data Source: Massachusetts Department of Education
Compiled by author.
From these data it seems clear that the formula for Chapter 70 aid created
by the Boverini-Collins Act is equalizing. Regression analysis indicates that
the factors most strongly related to the flow of new dollars in 1979 were: per
capita income, property wealth, local tax rate, fiscal constraints, and urbanness.
The slightly disequalizing initial effect of the save-harmless clause can be seen
in the increases in per pupil spending in high-wealth resorts, suburbs (especially
high income suburbs), and the high property-wealth quintile.
However, a more seriously disequalizing characteristic of the save-harmless
clause has emerged over the years since the 1978 reform. Table XXII indicates the
dollars per pupil each local school district received in FY1982 more than it would
have received if aid were distributed solely according to the Chapter 70 formula
(without the save-harmless clause). [A similar pattern exists with total aid
dollars.] As the table readily reveals, the chief beneficiaries of the save-
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harmless clause are suburbs, high-property wealth communities, high income
districts, and those with a low proportion of poverty families.
TABLE XXII
SURPLUS STATE AID DUE TO THE SAVE-HARMLESS CLAUSE IN CHAPTER 70, 1982
Surplus
Per Pupil
Aid
Low Property Wealth $ 46.9
Low-Moderate Wealth 176.2
Moderate Wealth 430.0
High-Moderate Wealth 384.4
High Wealth 312.4
Surplus
Per Pupil
Aid*
Cities $128.7
Suburbs 329.2
Rural Towns 140.4
High-We£ilth Resorts 268.9
State Average 251.0
Low Income $ 48.1
Low-Moderate Income 78.3
Moderate Income 224.7
High-Moderate Income 369.2
High Income 391.2
High Poverty (8% +) $110.3
Moderate Poverty (5-8%) 239.9
Low Poverty (under 5%) 356.8
*Amount actual FY1982 Chapter 70 aid exceeds the amount due the local district
under the state aid formula ajt current funding levels .
Data Sources: Massachusetts Department of Education, U. S. Census, 1980,
Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation
Compiled by author.
With the exception of the moderate property wealth quintile, the aid surplus
increases as property wealth and income increase and as the proportion of poverty
families decline. Surplus per pupil aid was significantly correlated with prop-
erty wealth, per capita income, the education level of the local community, local
tax rate, urbanness, and fiscal constraint. In other words, the communities
that tended to gain the most revenue from the Chapter 70 reform ( and to lose
the most under 2 1/2) are the most disadvantaged by the save-harmless clause.
Chapter 70 aid is therefore clearly inequitable in its effect .
The primary reason for the inequitable aid surplus is that the dollar guar-
antee does not take into account declining pupil enrollments. As enrollments
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decline, the formula-based aid figure also declines. However, actual aid
remains constant, thereby creating unanticipated inequities in Chapter 70.
While pupil enrollments have declined throughout most of the state (especially
in suburbs and cities) suburbs and high-wealth communities have been the chief
beneficiaries of aid 'surpluses because of the underfunding of Chapter 70. In
effect, aid for cities and low-wealth communities is so substantially under-
funded that their declining enrollments still leave them at a formula-based
aid level above the save-harmless guarantee. Despite declining enrollments,
in other words, several cities and low-wealth communities are still being under-
funded.
It is also noteworthy that all types of communities receive more aid on
the average than they "deserve" according to the formula (at current funding
levels) . Only a handful of communities still receive more dollars per pupil
by virtue of the Chapter 70 formula than they did in 1978. Thus the state
is prevented from achieving equity by the distribution of existing dollars as
much as the underfunding of Chapter 70. In total, surplus state aid in FY1982
amounted to $190 million, according to Department of Education figures.
As a result, the state faces distinct policy alternatives in attempting
to achieve educational equity. One "pure" alternative is to maximize equity
in the most efficient manner (subject to local constraints discussed in the
next section). Accordingly, the state would eliminate the save-harmless pro-
vision, and distribute Chapter 70 aid according to the formula—in other words,
re-distributing the $190 million in surplus aid to needy communities. The
chief disadvantages of this approach are its lack of political feasibility (a
majority of districts would receive less state aid) and the fact that it over-
looks good reasons for some state aid to all local school districts regardless
of the equity principle.
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The second "pure" alternative is to retain the save-harraless guarantee but
increase funding of Chapter 70 to the full 50% level. This option would be
expensive but would also greatly enhance equity and reduce the number of com-
munities guaranteed aid by the save-harmless clause. Political opposition
might arise to the expense and inefficiency (and a likely tax increase) at the
state level, but would be unlikely to arise among representatives of districts
losing aid.
It is possible to find a middle-ground between these two options. The
save-harmless guarantee could be reduced or phased-down to a smaller level (or
indexed to pupil enrollment) , while the average state share could be increased
to 40% or more. Funds could be generated from both the save-harmless phase-
down and from small state tax increases. Losses of revenue could be softened
by not eliminating save-harmless entirely. Exact proportions and their distrib-
utive effects could, of course, be explored through simulations.
In considering various approaches to equity, policy makers should bear in
mind the links between Chapter 70 aid, educational equity, and Proposition 2 1/2.
First, by increasing the equalizing power of Chapter 70 (through phase-down of
save-harmless and/or full funding) , the state would not only be enhancing equity
but would be counteracting the more burdensome effects of Proposition 2 1/2.
Second, the state would in all likelihood be improving taxpayer equity, and
therefore addressing one complaint underlying support for 2 1/2. Third, the
manner in which the state pursues equity, and the degree to which it does so,
are also relevant to voter sentiments expressed in the 1980 referendum. If the
state emphasizes increased funding without phasing down save-harmless, it is
enhancing equity at substantial cost (and, therefore, is doing so inefficiently),
If the state increases its contribution substantially, it also runs the risk of
alienating voters, particularly in the suburbs, who have expressed opposition to
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new state taxes (or who would lose state aid if the save-harmless clause were
phased-down)
.
The choices are obviously difficult, made more so by the existence of the
Webby v. King case. However, another obstacle to equity also needs to be con-
sidered: namely the degree to which local decision-making limits state efforts
to achieve equity through increases in (or more equitable distribution of)
state aid. This is especially true since Proposition 2 1/2 repealed the "fiscal
autonomy" of local school communities.
With the removal of fiscal autonomy, school budgets have become suscep-
tible to new fiscal and political pressures with unforeseen consequences for the
state's school finance system. These consequences are perhaps foreshadowed by
the relative distribution of cutbacks between educational and non-educational
budgets in the first year under 2 1/2. As noted previously (Table IX), suburbs
and high-wealth communities tended to "protect" educational budgets at the
expense of non-educational budgets, while the reverse tended to be true in low-
wealth communities (and, relatively speaking, in cities). One may surmise that
relative political support for services (as well as fiscal pressure) plays a
role in these reductions. As a result, one could expect school budgets to re-
main more vulnerable to municipal fiscal and political demands in the low prop-
erty-wealth and urban communities that are the primary targets of Chapter 70.
Another hint of future trends may be evident in the reactions of local
school districts to new state aid generated by the Chapter 70 reform in 1978.
As noted above, communities receiving large increments of new aid used much of
it to substitute for revenue generated by local property taxes, thus reducing
the local tax rate. Interestingly, however, the use of regression analysis
reveals that 1979 reductions in the local contribution to school spending were
best explained by the total municipal tax rate, rather than the school tax rate
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(also by the percent of families below poverty, a general service-demand char-
2
acteristic; the R for both variables was .25). It is plausible that local
decision makers were aware of general taxpayer pressures in these communities,
or a lack of local support for substantial increases in school spending.
In addition to municipal fiscal pressures, two factors that may also in-
fluence school budget decisions are teacher organization activity and the de-
gree of public accountability built into the local decision-making structure.
According to Laing's study (see Impact 2 1/2 Symposium, 1983), many local mayors
predicted that teacher organizations would have less influence on school budgets
once fiscal autonomy was repealed. Others, especially strong supporters of
2 1/2, have argued that the removal of fiscal autonomy will make school commit-
tees more accountable to public priorities.
Both claims reflect assumptions about local decision making. The pre-
diction regarding teacher organizations not only reflects the view that teacher
organizations will have to compete in a new manner against other local interests,
but, implicitly, that teacher organizations have had a significant impact on
local budgets in the past. Similarly, the view of school committee account-
ability assumes that budgetary independence from municipal authorities can be
equated with the absence of public accountability. Or, put somewhat differently,
that school spending has been higher than the public wanted it to be because
school committees were not accountable to the municipal budget-making process.
In both cases, it is difficult to generate evidence that speaks to these
arguments. Initial insights into local budget decisions can be gleaned from
the Impact 2 1/2 case studies (see Proposition 2 1/2: Its Impact on Massachusetts ,
1983), which provide important in-depth coverage of first-year 2 1/2-effects in
selected communities.
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Teacher Organization Activity
It is extremely difficult to determine precisely the impact of teacher
organization activity on local budgets (or, in fact, on teachers' salaries).
For the most part, studies have failed to show that teacher organizations or
teacher "militancy" have had a significant inflationary impact on salaries or
spending when other factors related to salary or spending level are controlled
(see Cresswell, 1980). It seems likely that teacher organization activity grows
out of two-sided conflicts over essential items like wages and salaries, benefits,
and working conditions. In some cases these conflicts may reflect aggressive-
ness on the part of teacher organizations or their leaders; in others they may
reflect fiscal or political constraints on local spending. For whatever reasons
(and there are probably many) , conflict exists when school districts opt for
mediation or fact-finding, or when negotiations break down completely and a strike
is called.
By examining patterns in the cases of mediation or fact-finding, it is pos-
sible to gauge more accurately the factors that are associated with local con-
flict as well as the "effects" of these conflicts. Table XXIII indicates the
percentage of local school districts that experienced either mediation or fact-
finding in the years from 1978 to 1982 (again, wholly or partially regional dis-
tricts are excluded) . One may examine the degree to which conf licfual negoti-
ations took place in communities characterized by fiscal stress, and by high or
low per pupil spending levels.
Please see Table XXIII on page 47.
One tendency is fairly clear, mediation or fact-finding tend to occur more
in fiscally-stressed communities (e.g., cities and the lower property wealth
quintile) , and less in high property wealth resorts and the high-wealth quintile.
The data that might reveal a link between mediation and spending levels are in-
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conclusive. The tendency for mediation to occur was weakly but negatively re-
lated to spending levels in all years but 1980, \hen it was weakly but positively
linked to spending (and more significantly linked to municipal tax rates)
.
As a result one can discern a link between contract mediation and local
fiscal constraints, but not with local spending levels. Table XXIV provides
additional insight into conflictual negotiations by testing for a link between
mediation in one year (1978) and spending increases the following year. As the
table illustrates, there is a tendency for spending to increase at a somewhat
higher-than-average rate in communities which experienced fact-finding in 1978.
However, these districts also received substantially above-average increments of
new state aid under Chapter 70. They were also more likely to reduce the local
contribution to school spending (and to reduce local school tax rates) . Signif-
icantly, the per pupil spending level achieved in 1979 was considerably lower
than the state average in these districts. [Interestingly, districts that re-
ceived large aid increments for 1979 and reduced local school taxes were more
likely to experience contract mediation or fact-finding during 1979. However,
the latter districts increased spending from 1979-80 only marginally above the
state average (5.7% vs. 5.6%) resulting in below-average spending levels.]
Please see Table XXIV on page 49.
As a result there seems to be no demonstrable link between teacher contract
mediation or fact-finding in 1978 and subsequent spending increases or levels
in the year after Chapter 70 reforms were implemented. Analysis of subsequent
years bears out this finding. In no year did mediation and/or fact-finding
result in significantly above-average increases or spending levels the following
year.
These data, while limited, therefore support a view that teacher contract
conflict is more likely to be linked to local fiscal constraints than any teacher
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TABLE XXIV
1978 MEDIATION AND FACT-FINDING AND 1979 LOCAL BUDGET SHIFTS
Local Districts With :
No Mediation or
Fact-Finding
Mediation
Fact Finding
% Change in
Pupil Spend:
1978-9
Per
Lng
%
Ch.
Change in
70 State Aid
1978-9
6.9% 16 . 4%
7.2 13.7
8.0 25.6
No Mediation or
Fact-Finding
Mediation
Fact Finding
% Change .
Contribution
Spending
Ln Local
to School
1978-9
1979
Per Pupil
Spending
2.5% $1968
4.5 1955
-2.7 1841
Data Sources: Board of Arbitration and Conciliation, Massachusetts Department
of Education
Compiled by author.
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militancy that might operate independent of these constraints. They also
fail to support any contention that contract conflicts resulting in mediation
or fact-finding are likely to produce "excessive" spending levels in ensuing
years. More data are needed for these questions to be examined conclusively,
but at least the evidence presented here challenges presumptions to the con-
trary.
Local Accountability
It is equally difficult to evaluate claims that the repeal of fiscal au-
tonomy will result in greater school committee accountability. Public opinion
surveys would have to be conducted in a variety of communities to ascertain
whether or not public satisfaction with school spending has increased in light
of local budget decisions. However, it is noteworthy that public opinion polls
conducted after first-year budget cutbacks were becoming visible revealed that
the public felt cutbacks were excessive, especially in education (Becker, April,
1981; Patterson, October, 1981).
Additionally, democratic theory posits that public accountability is
greater when decisions are "closer to the public"—i.e., made by deliberative
bodies that have high visibility and high citizen access. The Impact 2 1/2
studies indicate that first-year budget decisions were more centralized in the
hands of municipal executives than in past years. Both department heads and
town meetings played a smaller role in budget deliberations (Impact 2 1/2, 1983)
Arguably public accountability declined.
One intriguing finding linked to budget cutbacks also suggests that local
citizens didn't exactly get what they wanted when school budgets were sub-
stantially reduced. Deep cutbacks in instructional personnel were more likely
to occur in communities governed by city or town councils, rather than town
meetings. Of course, governance structures are also related to community type,
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population size, and density, and thus this may be a spurious relationship.
However, as indicated by Table XXV, a higher percentage of deep cuts were
made in city/town councils (and smaller cutbacks in town meetings) even among
similar types of community . Although the number of cases in each category
were sometimes too small to generate statistically significant differences,
the pattern was consistent: governance structures with greater citizen access
or" representation were less likely to make sizeable reductions in the teacher
workforce . One might surmise that the citizen view expressed in public opinion
polls—namely satisfaction with the quality of local schools and reluctance
to reduce the level of service delivery—was more likely to be heeded where
budget decisions were at least nominally shared with accessible, representative
bodies like town meetings. In the more centralized city or town council struc-
tures, it may have been "easier" to make these cutbacks. Significantly, re-
gression analysis indicates that the fact of having a town meeting structure,
rather than city/town council, was a significant deterrent to teacher work-
force reductions, even when local fiscal pressures were taken into account.
TABLE XXV
LOCAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND SCHOOL CUTBACKS*, 1982
Cities
Suburbs
Rural Towns
High-Wealth Resorts
High Density Communities
Greater than 50,000
population
25-50,000 population
Percent Making Cutbacks Exceeding 14%
Rep resentative Open
City/Town Councils Town Meetings Town Meetings
52.6% 25.0%
75.0% 24.0% 31.3%
60.0% 60.0% 18.8%
50.0% 20.0%
50.0%
50.0%
72.5%
26.1%
33.3%
28.6%
*Reductions in the teaching work force.
Data Sources: Massachusetts Municipal Association, Massachusetts Department
of Education, U. S. Census 1980.
Compiled by author.
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As a result, it does not seem likely that the substantial educational
cutbacks (especially in instructional staff and funding) were made in response
to local citizen input. If anything, the opposite seems to have occurred.
Cutbacks were extensive in communities that were fiscally stressed. However,
in communities of comparable stress levels, the teaching workforce was tar-
geted for substantial reductions where citizen access was low. One may con-
clude, therefore, that, at least in public education, Proposition 2 1/2 has
thus far had an inequitable impact, with no measurable gain in public ac-
countability.
CONCLUSION
This report has examined a wide range of data relevant to the impact of
Proposition 2 1/2, with particular emphasis on public education. This analysis
results in a number of conclusions pertinent to state policy makers:
(1) The state of Massachusetts has a policy responsibility for the ade-
quacy and equality of educational opportunities of all its young
people.
(2) In 1978, the state's school finance system, Chapter 70, was revised
to enhance educational equity. The initial flow of new aid was
equitable, and local budgetary decisions resulted in increased tax-
payer equity (but not increased educational or pupil equity)
.
(3) Because of the inclusion of save-harmless guarantees, Chapter 70
funding has become increasingly inequitable. Educational and fis-
cally needy districts have been ill-served by the retention of the
save-harmless clause.
(4) These same districts have suffered disproportionately at the hands
of Proposition 2 1/2-mandated revenue losses.
(5) Even when the state has attempted to soften the blow of 2 1/2, the
net result has still been inequitable: fiscally-stressed cities and
low property wealth communities have continued to suffer the greatest
per capita revenue losses. Despite having larger poverty populations
and fewer high school graduates attending four-year colleges and
universities, these communities made more drastic cutbacks in school
budgets—especially in their instructional budgets. They did so
primarily because of fiscal pressures, not in response to apparent
or potential public input.
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(6) Ultimately the burden of 2 1/2, and of inequicably-distributed state
aid, is borne by needier pupils and their families. In short,
Massachusetts is moving away from, rather than towards, fulfillment
of its policy responsibilities in education.
These conclusions, and the findings reviewed in the previous pages would
seem to indicate that Massachusetts has not come very far in responding to
undercurrents of public dissatisfaction that were successfully tapped by
Proposition 2 1/2. First, as amply documented above, fiscal and service-
level equity has suffered because of 2 1/2.
Second, efficiency has suffered in at least three respects: (a) state
dollars are distributed in a manner that hampers state efforts to achieve
equity, resulting in an unnecessarily expensive state-aid package in education,
(b) The most fiscally stressed communities made educational cutbacks in excess
of 10%; whereas modest reductions may result in improved efficiency, those
that exceed 10% are likely to result in service-delivery inefficiencies (see
Menchik, et al, 1982). (c) Communities that suffered the greatest revenue
losses in 1982, made the largest cutbacks in educational instruction, yet si-
multaneously used new state aid to increase spending levels in educational ad-
ministration.
Third, it can be argued that school system accountability has declined
in an inequitable manner. Communities where school constituencies were more
sizeable experienced fewer fiscal pressures and suffered smaller revenue losses.
They were also more likely (than cities) to have town meeting forms of gover-
nance. The result: they were significantly Le.-»a likely to reduce school bud-
gets, particularly in instruction. On the other hand, where school constitu-
encies were smaller there was also less access to budgetary decision-making.
These communities also experienced greater fiscal pressures and suffered larger
revenue losses. The result: substantial reductions in school spending.
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This correspondence between local fiscal inequities and variations in
local educational accountability suggests ways in which the state can design
policies so as to optimize both values. Traditionally, local decision making
is valued because it is viewed as enhancing government accountability. As
demonstrated in the foregoing analysis, the system of local decision-making
as it is presently constituted, has acted as an obstacle to state efforts to
achieve educational equity. However, this is not solely because the present
system is based on the principle of accountability, but because local decision-
making systems are unequally accountable.
Currently, the simple increase of state aid to the neediest districts
may not improve educational equity or equal opportunity at all because these
districts, largely urban, have greater non-educational demands on available
revenue (for both political and fiscal reasons). Decision-makers are also
more shielded from public input. The repeal of fiscal autonomy, made in the
name of accountability, only worsens this situation.
State efforts to remedy inequities caused by Proposition 2 1/2 and to
enhance educational equity should therefore be guided by simultaneous con-
sideration of equity goals, inefficiencies in the distribution of state aid,
and variations in local systems of accountability. Many options are being
considered. One possible scenario for optimizing the values of equity, ef-
ficiency, accountability, and local decision-making might reflect the fol-
lowing principles or components:
(1) The state has a special responsibility in the area of public edu-
cation (which is not to deny other special responsibilities) . As
a result, educational decision-making, and state aid for education
should be considered as separate from other municipal areas. Other-
wise, educational equity will not be achieved.
(2) In education , the state's share of school spending should be in-
creased substantially to bring Massachusetts in line with the
national average. [The 50% share designated by Chapter 70 would
seem to be a suitable level.]
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(3) Chapter 70 aid should be distributed as closely as possible to the
formula standards determined by local property wealth. Save-harmless
aid should be substantially phased down or indexed to pupil enroll-
ments. This will enhance the likelihood of educational equity con-
siderably without using state taxpayer dollars inefficiently.
(4) The targeting of state money for education and accountability to '
local constituencies could be optimized by a reinstatement of fiscal
autonomy in conjunction with a more open and representative decision-
making process in local school districts/communities. Substantial
increments in state aid would soften local concern for school spending
levels among non-school constituencies; however, some initial con-
straints on the use of these increments would seem necessary.
(5) In other areas of municipal budgets, greater emphasis should be placed
on constitutional changes that would allow for local option taxation.
Sufficient latitude in revenue options should be allowed to compensate
for inequities built into local wage or sales taxes. State aid would
still be appropriate for certain categorical purposes and to compensate
districts for remaining revenue-raising or service-need inequities.
However, the level of state aid could be reduced as part of a shift
toward local option taxes. Decisions regarding the latter would re-
quire more "expert" local decision making but also greater scrutiny
by the affected public. Public accountability could conceivably be
increased, especially if decision-making structures were more open to
citizen input. Structural reforms would seem to be necessary.
These principles are broadly stated and they tend to gloss over a number
of highly complex issues. However, as the analysis in this report demonstrates,
Proposition 2 1/2 has left Massachusetts in a condition where action needs to
be taken to enhance equity, efficiency, and local accountability.
APPENDIX: LIST OF "CITIES"
Auburn
Boston
Brockton
Cambridge
Chelsea
Chicopee
East Hampton
Everett
Fall River
Fitchburg
Haverhill
Holyoke
Lawrence
Lee
Leominster
Lowell
Lynn
Maiden
Medford
Millbury
Monson
New Bedford
Peabody
Pittsfield
Quincy
Revere
Salem
Somerville
Springfield
Waltham
Warren
Watertown
Worcester
NOTES
1. Most substantial among these are the Impact 2 1/2 Consortium studies:
the bi-weekly newsletter and the two publications cited below. In addition,
the author gratefully acknowledges the many groups and individuals who
shared study findings or data with him: Becker Research Corporation,
Citizens for Limited Taxation, Dr. Helen Ladd, Massachusetts Department
of Education, Massachusetts Department of Revenue, Massachusetts Board of
Conciliation and Arbitration, Massachusetts Municipal Association, Massa-
chusetts Association of School Superintendents, Massachusetts Association
of School Committees, Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation, and Dr. Franklin
Patterson and associates at the Center for Studies in Policy and the
Public Interest at the University of Massachusetts in Boston.
2. Conceptually, these two aspects of fiscal distress are drawn from Katharine
Bradbury's studies in the New England Economic Review, 1982. Some of my
measures of distress are, however, different, because of data availability.
3. The most significant aspects of the Boverini-Collins reform bill include:
(a) a changeover in fiscal capacity measures from per pupil property wealth
to per capita property wealth, (b) the combination of general, special,
vocational, and bi-lingual education funding schemes in one formula, (c)
a switch from reimbursement-based to current-year funding, and (d) a target
figure of 50% state aid to the average-wealth community --a figure that
has never been approached under the reform bill.
'+. While the data are spending figures, they reflect spending from revenue
derived from state and local sources only. Thus they are comparable to
other studies that examine the equity of state school finance schemes.
Specifically, these figures represent the "Integrated Operating Costs" of
local school districts, in which regional costs are integrated into the
school budgets of cities and towns.
5. See, for example, the studies of Carroll (1979) and Odden, Berne, and
Stiefel (1979).
6. According to an Education Commission of the States' study (ECS, 1981),
Massachusetts ranked 47th in the nation in educational equity, as measured
by the coefficient of variation (1977-78 data).
7. According to the Massachusetts Taxpayers Foundation report, "State Budget
Trends, 1974-1983," local aid increased $300 million in 1978-79 (including
Chapter 70 reform), and $280 million in 1981-82 (compensation for 2 1/2
losses). In all, local aid increased $900 million from 1978 to 1983
(the latter date representing budget appropriations); in this time, the
percent of state expenditures designated for local aid increased from 25%
to 30%.
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